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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a large number of Americans have established
"asset protection trusts" in foreign countries.' An asset protection
trust is a self-settled spendthrift trust which is created in order to
protect the settlor's property from the claims of creditors. 2 Virtu-
ally all American jurisdictions recognize spendthrift trusts, which
prohibit both voluntary and involuntary alienation of a third party
beneficiary's interest in a trust;3 however, most do not allow a
settlor who has retained a beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust
to protect that interest from the claims of creditors. 4 A growing
number of present and former British possessions, however, have
enacted laws that allow foreigners to create self-settled spend-
thrift or asset protection trusts in their territory. 5 Although legal
commentators disagree about the legitimacy of these offshore
trusts,6 American courts have treated them with undisguised hos-
1. Stephen G. Giles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 639
(2006).
2. Ritchie W. Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: The "Estate Planning Tool of
the Decade" or a Charlatan?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 163, 164 (1998).
3. Karen E. Boxx, Gray's Ghost - A Conversation About the Offshore Trust, 85 IOWA
L. REV. 1195, 1203 (2000).
4. Michael Sjuggerud, Comment, Defeating the Self-Settled Trust in Bankruptcy, 28
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 977, 979 (2001).
5. Denise C. Brown, Caribbean Asset Protection Trust: Here Comes the Sun - Dispel-
ling the Dark Clouds of Controversy, U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 133, 135-36 (1998).
6. Cf. Barry S. Engel, Using Foreign Situs Trusts for Asset Protection Planning, 20
EST. PLAN. 212, 218 (1993) (stating that "the foreign situs asset protection trust can be a
useful planning vehicle for wealthy people who wish to protect their assets from the perils
of living in our modern-day society"), and Jonathan L. Mezrich, It's Better in the Bahamas:
Asset Protection Trusts for the Pennsylvania Lawyer, 98 DICK. L. REV. 657, 675 (1994) (ar-
guing that "asset protection is simply a reasonable reaction to today's 'court-happy' society,
and should be allowed until the U.S. judiciary or legal community finds a way to reign-in
[sic] damaging, frivolous lawsuits and litigiousness") with Randall J. Gingiss, Putting a
Stop to "Asset Protection" Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 987, 1033 (1999) (declaring that
"[a]sset protection trusts, be they offshore or domestic, offend the public policy of the over-
whelming majority of American states"), and Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection
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tility.7 In this article, I argue that offshore asset protection trusts
serve a legitimate purpose and, therefore, American courts should
enforce them, at least when certain conditions are met. Specifi-
cally, the transfer of assets to the offshore trust must not be
fraudulent; the settlor should not retain any beneficial interest in
the trust other than a reversion; the settlor should not retain a
power of appointment nor act as trustee or trust protector; the
settlor should retain a copy of the trust instrument; and the trust
instrument should require the trustee to render periodic account-
ings to the settlor and all trust beneficiaries. If these conditions
are satisfied, a domestic court should apply the law of the trust
situs and recognize the validity of the offshore trust.
Part I of this article analyzes the law applicable to domestic
spendthrift trusts and describes the characteristics of a typical
offshore asset protection trust. This portion of the article also
surveys recent legislation that allows the establishment of asset
protection trusts in some American jurisdictions. In Part II, I ex-
amine a number of decisions in which American courts have at-
tempted to undermine the effectiveness of offshore asset protec-
tion trusts. These cases have involved domestic fraudulent trans-
fer laws, jurisdiction and choice of law issues, protective devices in
offshore trusts and the formulation of remedies to strengthen the
hand of domestic creditors. Finally, in Part III, I consider the pol-
icy arguments for and against the recognition of offshore asset
protection trusts, and propose an approach for American courts to
adopt.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO OFFSHORE ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS
An offshore asset protection trust is a form of spendthrift trust
that is established in a foreign country. Unlike the rule in the
United States, many foreign jurisdictions recognize "self-settled"
spendthrift trusts, that is, trusts which are designed to protect the
settlor from the claims of creditors. In this portion of the article, I
will review the law applicable to spendthrift trusts in America and
Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 80 (1994) (contending
that offshore asset protection trusts "invite U.S. settlors to defeat deep-seated public policy
in this country").
7. E.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir.
1999) (declaring that "[tihe 'asset protection' aspect of these foreign trusts arises from the
ability of people . . . to frustrate and impede the United States courts by moving their as-
sets beyond those courts' jurisdictions"); Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 62 P.2d 587, 593
(Wyo. 2003) (stating that "the use of such trusts to avoid alimony, child support and a fair
division of marital property upon divorce is reprehensible to us").
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will also examine some of the salient features of offshore trusts.
Additionally, this article will consider recent legislation recogniz-
ing domestic self-settled spendthrift trusts.
A. Spendthrift Trusts
Ordinarily, a trust beneficiary can voluntarily transfer his or
her interest in a trust.8 Furthermore, a creditor of the beneficiary
can attach or execute upon such an interest to satisfy a debt. 9
However, in most states the settlor can restrict alienation of a
beneficial interest in the trust by making the trust a spendthrift
trust.10 A spendthrift trust prohibits a trust beneficiary from vol-
untarily transferring an interest to a third party and prevents
creditors of a beneficiary from reaching the beneficiary's interest
in the trust through garnishment or attachment." Of course, the
spendthrift clause does not protect against creditors once funds
are distributed by the trustee to a beneficiary. 12
However, spendthrift trusts do not provide complete protection
against creditors' claims. Alimony creditors, support creditors,
providers of necessary goods and services, and government enti-
ties may be able to reach a debtor's interest in a spendthrift
trust. 13 For example, state courts and statutes frequently allow
children of the beneficiary to reach the assets of spendthrift trusts
for child support. 14 Alimony claimants may sometimes reach a
8. Matter of Lopez, 636 P.2d 731, 738 (Haw. 1981); Matter of Dodge Testamentary
Trust, 330 N.W.2d 72, 87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
9. Realty Exch. Corp. v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 487 P.2d 420, 423 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1977); Chandler v. Hale, 377 A.2d 318, 323 (Conn. 1977); Henderson v. Collins, 267 S.E.2d
202, 207 (Ga. 1980); New England Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Hoss, 249 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Mass.
1969); Morrison v. Doyle, 582 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Minn. 1998).
10. Estate of Edgar, 389 N.W.2d 696, 702 (Mich. 1986); Lundgren v. Hoglund, 711 P.2d
809, 812 (Mont. 1985); First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. First Cadco Bank, 205 N.W.2d 115,
118 (Neb. 1973); Domo v. McCarthy, 612 N.E.2d 706, 710 (Ohio 1993); Albergotti v. Sum-
mers, 26 S.E.2d 395, 398 (S.C. 1943); First Bank & Trust v. Goss, 533 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976); Erickson v. Bank of Cal., 643 P.2d 670, 672 (Wash. 1982).
11. Schreiber v. Kellogg, 50 F.3d 264, 267 (3d Cir. 1995); First Nw. Trust Co. of S.D. v.
I.R.S., 622 F.2d 387, 391 (8th Cir. 1980).
12. Kelly v. Kelly, 79 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Cal. 1938); Moffat v. Lynch, 642 S.W.2d 624, 626
(Mo. 1982); State ex rel. Nixon v. Turpin, 994 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
13. Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 77 (1995).
14. Howard v. Spragins, 350 So. 2d 318, 322 (Ala. 1977); Ex parte Boykin, 656 So. 2d
821, 827 (Ala. Ct. App. 1994); In re Matt, 473 N.E.2d 1310, 1312 (111. 1985); In re Marriage
of Chapman, 697 N.E.2d 365, 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Zouch v. Zouch, 104 A.2d 573, 578-79
(Md. 1954); Hurley v. Hurley, 309 N.W.2d 225, 227-28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Eaton v.
Eaton, 125 A. 433 (N.H. 1924); Matter of Chusid, 301 N.Y.S.2d 766, 775 (N.Y. Surr. Ct.
1969); Matthews v. Matthews, 450 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Shelley v. Shelley,
354 P.2d 282, 288 (Or. 1960).
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beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust as well. 15 In addition,
providers of necessary goods and services may be allowed to reach
a beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust for payment. 16 Fi-
nally, claims against a trust beneficiary by a government entity
for unpaid taxes can sometimes be recovered against a benefici-
ary's interest in a spendthrift trust. 17
Creditors can also reach a beneficiary's interest in a self-settled
spendthrift trust. 18 Although there is nothing to prevent a settlor
from establishing a self-settled trust,19 almost all courts refuse to
enforce spendthrift provisions in self-settled trusts where the
settlor has retained a beneficial interest, at least as far as that
interest is concerned. 20 This rule has been endorsed by the Uni-
form Trust Code (UTC) 21 and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.
22
15. Council v. Owens, 770 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989); Southeast Bank v.
Gilbert, 463 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 1985); Miller v. Miller, 643 N.E.2d 288, 294 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995); Flaherty v. Flaherty, 638 A.2d 1254, 1257 (N.H. 1994); Cogswell v. Cogswell, 167
P.2d 324, 335 (Or. 1946).
16. Am. Sec. & Trust Co. v. Utley, 382 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Sisters of Mercy
Health Corp. v. First Bank of Whiting, 624 N.E.2d 520, 522 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Matter of
Estate of Dodge, 281 N.W.2d 447, 541 (Iowa 1979); Matter of Estate of Ferguson, 465
N.E.2d 357, 361 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Erickson v. Bank of Cal., N.A., 643 P.2d 670, 673
(Wash. 1982).
17. Bank One Ohio Trust Co. v. United States, 80 F.3d 173, 176 (6th Cir. 1996); First
Nw. Trust Co. v. I.R.S., 622 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rye, 550 F.2d 682,
685 (1st Cir. 1977); Leuschner v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 261 F.2d 705, 708 (9th Cir.
1958); United States v. Grimm, 865 F. Supp. 1303, 1310 (N.D. Ind. 1994); LaSalle Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 874, 876-77 (N.D. Ill. 1986); United States v. Riggs
Nat'l Bank, 636 F. Supp. 172, 176-77 (D.D.C. 1986).
18. This rule also applies to both discretionary trusts and support trusts. See Menotte
v. Brown, 303 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2002) (support trust); In re Robins, 826 F.2d 293,
295 (4th Cir. 1987) (support trust); Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 27 A.2d 166, 173 (Conn.
1942) (discretionary trust); Ware v. Gulda, 117 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. 1954) (discretionary
trust); In re Hortsberg Inter Vivos Trust, 578 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Mich. 1998) (discretionary
trust); McKeon v. Dept. of Mental Health, 479 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (discre-
tionary trust).
19. John E. Sullivan III, Gutting the Rule Against Self-Settled Trusts: How the New
Delaware Trust Law Competes with Offshore Trusts, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 423, 427 (1998).
20. Fidelity Bank v. Commonwealth Marine & Gen. Assur. Co., Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 999,
1012 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Cameron v. Edmonds, 223 B.R. 20, 24 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998); In re
Cohen, 8 P.3d 429, 432-34 (Colo. 1999); Speed v. Speed, 430 S.E.2d 348, 349 (Ga. 1993);
Matter of Estate of Nagel, 580 N.W.2d 810, 811 (Iowa 1998); Hanson v. Minette, 461
N.W.2d 592, 596 (Iowa 1990); Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 386 So. 2d 1112, 1115
(Miss. 1980); Allen v. Wessman, 542 N.W.2d 748, 752-53 (N.D. 1996); Wilson v. Dixon, 598
N.E.2d 158, 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Johnson v. Commercial Bank, 588 P.2d 1096 (Or.
1978); Prestige Bank v. Inv. Properties Group, Inc., 825 A.2d 698, 700-02 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003); McLean v. McLean, 257 S.E.2d 751, 753 (S.C. 1979); Farmers State Bank v. Janish,
410 N.W.2d 188, 189 (S.D. 1987); Bank of Dallas v. Republic Nat. Bank of Dallas, 540
S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. App. 1976).
21. UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 505(a)(2) (2004).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58(2) (2003).
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Most courts apply this rule even if the settlor did not intend to
defraud creditors when the trust was created.23
B. Offshore Asset Protection Trusts
Because domestic spendthrift trusts, especially self-settled ones,
do not provide sufficient protection against the claims of creditors,
an increasing number of wealthy Americans have turned to off-
shore asset protection trusts as an alternative. 24 An offshore asset
protection trust is a trust that a domestic settlor establishes in a
foreign jurisdiction to achieve some measure of protection against
the claims of domestic creditors. 25 Some of the more popular loca-
tions for offshore asset protection trusts are Anguilla, the Baha-
mas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the
Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, the Isle of
Man, Jersey, Mauritius, Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and the
Turks and Caicos Islands. 26 All of these are present or former
British possessions where English is spoken and English common
law is recognized. 2
7
23. In re Cohen, 8 P.3d 429, 434 (Colo. 1999); Nagel, 580 N.W.2d at 811-12; Farmers
State Bank, 410 N.W.2d at 190.
24. Giles, supra note 1, at 639.
25. Susanna C. Brennan, Comment, Changes in Climate: The Movement of Asset Pro-
tection Trusts from International to Domestic Shores and Its Effect on Creditors' Rights, 79
OR. L. REV. 755, 766 (2000).
26. Engel, supra note 6, at 213.
27. Anguilla, population 13,477, is a 40-square-mile island located in the Caribbean,
east of Puerto Rico. The World Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/av.html (last visited July 28, 2006). A
British overseas territory (or colony), Anguila's main commercial activities are luxury
tourism, offshore banking and lobster fishing. Id. The Bahamas, population 303,770, is a
chain of Caribbean islands located southeast of Florida. The World Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geosIbf.html (last visited July 28, 2006). The
total land area of the Bahamian islands is about 5381 square miles. Id. The Bahamas
gained its independence from Great Britain in 1973, and its economy is heavily dependent
on tourism, construction and offshore banking. Id. Barbados, population 279,912, is a 166-
square-mile Caribbean island located northeast of Venezuela. The World Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bb.html (last visited July 28, 2006). A
former British colony, Barbados has been independent since 1966. Id. Its diversified econ-
omy includes sugarcane cultivation, light industry, tourism and offshore finance. Id.
Belize, formerly British Honduras, is located in Central America between Guatemala and
Mexico. The World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publicationslfactbook/geos/bh.html
(last visited July 28, 2006). It is 22,966 square miles and has a population of 287,730. Id.
Belize became independent in 1981, and its major industries include tourism, fishing, agri-
culture and clothing manufacture. Id. Bermuda is a British Overseas Territory located in
the Atlantic Ocean, east of South Carolina. The World Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geosfbd.html (last visited July 28, 2006). It is
approximately 21 square miles in area and has a population of 65,773. Id. Economy activ-
ity involves the providing of financial services for international business and luxury ac-
commodations for tourists. Id. The British Virgin Islands, population 23,098, are com-
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Typically, offshore asset protection trusts have several common
characteristics. First, the settlor will not retain any beneficial
prised of sixteen inhabited and more than twenty uninhabited islands in the Caribbean Sea
east of Puerto Rico. The World Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/vi.html (last visited July 28, 2006). The
British Virgin Islands are about 59 square miles in area and are a British Overseas Terri-
tory. Id. The economy depends heavily on tourism, and a large number of foreign compa-
nies are now incorporated there. Id. The Cayman Islands, a British Overseas Territory,
are located about 145 miles south of Cuba and 160 miles northwest of Jamaica. The World
Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cj.html (last visited July 28,
2006). The islands are about 100 square miles in size and have a population of 45,436. Id.
Tourism is an important industry. Id. In addition, more than 40,000 companies are now
registered in the Cayman Islands, including almost 600 banks and trust companies. Id.
The Cook Islands, a group of fifteen islands located in the southern Pacific Ocean between
Hawaii and New Zealand, are self-governing, but are affiliated with New Zealand. The
World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbooklgeos/cw.html (last visited July
28, 2006). The islands are only 92.6 square miles in area and have a population of 21,388.
Id. They export copra, fresh and processed fruit, clothing and handicrafts. Id. Cyprus, a
large island in the eastern Mediterranean Sea south of Turkey, obtained its independence
from Great Britain in 1960. The World Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cy.html (last visited July 28, 2006). The
island is 3570 square miles in area, and its population is 784,301. Id. The Cypriot econ-
omy is primarily based on tourism and financial services. Id. Gibraltar is a British Over-
seas Territory located on the southern coast of Spain directly across from Morocco. The
World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gi.html (last visited July
28, 2006). Gibraltar is only 2.5 square miles in area and has a population of 27,928. Id. Its
economy benefits from shipping, offshore banking and tourism. Id. The Isle of Man, lo-
cated in the Irish Sea between Great Britain and Ireland, is a British crown dependency,
but is not part of the United Kingdom. The World Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbooklgeos/im.html (last visited July 28, 2006). It is
approximately 221 square miles in area and has a population of 75,441. Id. Offshore bank-
ing, manufacturing and tourism have replaced agriculture and fishing as major contribu-
tors to the economy. Id. Jersey, another British crown dependency, is located in the Eng-
lish Channel northwest of France. The World Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/je.html (last visited July 28, 2006). The
island is about 45 square miles in area and has a population of 91,084. Id. Its economy is
based on international financial services, agriculture and tourism. Id. Mauritius, an is-
land located in the Indian Ocean east of Madagascar, obtained its independence from Great
Britain in 1968. The World Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mp.html (last visited July 28, 2006).
Mauritius is about 787 square miles in area and has a population of 1,240,827. Id. In
addition to its textile and tourism industry, Mauritius has expanded its local financial
institutions and has attracted more than 9,000 offshore entities, many of which trade with
India and South Africa. Id. Saint Kitts and Nevis are two Caribbean islands located be-
tween Puerto Rico and Trinidad. The World Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbooklgeos/sc.html (last visited July 28, 2006). A
former British colony, Saint Kitts and Nevis achieved independence in 1983. Id. The is-
lands are about 100 square miles in area and have a combined population of 39,129. Id.
Sugar production is still the primary industry; tourism, export-oriented manufacturing and
offshore banking are now important segments of the islands' economy. Id. The Turks and
Caicos Islands, a British Overseas Territory, consist of two island groups in the Caribbean
Sea southeast of the Bahamas and north of Haiti. The World Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tk.html (last visited July 28, 2006). The
islands' total area is 166 square miles, and their population is 21,152. Id. The economy is
based on tourism, fishing and offshore financial services. Id.
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interest in the trust other than a contingent reversionary interest,
and the trust will be irrevocable, thereby leaving no interest for
creditors to reach. 28 In addition, the trust will either terminate
after a fixed number of years with a reversionary interest in the
settlor, or after a longer period based on the lives of the settlor or
the trust's beneficiaries. 29 Normally, the settlor will not act as
trustee; instead, the trustee will be a foreign trust company or fi-
nancial institution.30 The trust will give the trustee sole discre-
tion to distribute trust income or principal to named beneficiaries,
such as the settlor's spouse or children. 31 Also, the trust will state
that the situs of the trust will govern the trust provisions.32
Properly drafted offshore asset protection trusts can provide
settlors with a high degree of protection against the claims of
creditors. 33 First of all, American courts usually cannot obtain
personal jurisdiction over a foreign trustee.34 In addition, most
foreign jurisdictions will not enforce judgments obtained in an
American court. 35 Instead, creditors must travel to the country
where the trust is located and litigate their claims under foreign
laws. 36 In most of these jurisdictions, contingent fees are not al-
lowed, and foreign attorneys often demand that their fees be paid
in advance. 37 Furthermore, if there is litigation, the loser must
pay all court costs.
38
Moreover, asset protection trusts are governed by the substan-
tive laws and procedures of the situs jurisdiction, which are often
highly favorable to debtors. 39 For example, fraudulent transfer
laws in these jurisdictions often require creditors to prove that the
28. James T. Lorenzetti, The Offshore Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection Scheme,
102 CoM. L.J. 138, 150 (1997).
29. Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Note, Law for Sale: Alaska and Delaware Compete for the
Asset Protection Trust Market and the Wealth That Follows, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 831,
848 (1999).
30. Marty-Nelson, supra note 6, at 13. If the settlor acts as trustee, an American court
may order him to exercise his discretionary powers as trustee to distribute trust funds to
himself and thus to his creditors. Id.
31. Brown, supra note 5, at 134.
32. Paul M. Roder, Note, American Asset Protection Trusts: Alaska and Delaware Move
"Offshore" Trusts onto the Mainland, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1253, 1256 (1999).
33. Brown, supra note 5, at 134.
34. Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2761, 2764 (2006) [hereinafter Trust Protectors].
35. Roder, supra note 32, at 1256.
36. Brennan, supra note 25, at 768.
37. Debra Baker, Island Castaway, 84 A.B.A. J. 54, 56 (Oct. 1998).
38. Taylor, supra note 2, at 172.
39. Lorenzetti, supra note 28, at 140.
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settlor actually intended to "delay, hinder or defraud" them. 40 In
addition, these jurisdictions require a higher standard of proof
than is normally required for civil litigants in American courts.
41
Furthermore, the statute of limitations in many foreign jurisdic-
tions begins to run at the time of the transfer and usually expires
within a year or two thereafter. 42 Consequently, by the time a
creditor finds out where the debtor's property is located, the local
statute of limitations often will have run, effectively barring suit
in the trust situs jurisdiction.
43
The typical asset protection trust will contain a number of pro-
tective devices that will enable the settlor to exercise some control
over the trust property and protect against adverse changes in
circumstances. These include: (1) a trust protector clause, (2) an
anti-duress clause, (3) a flight clause, (4) and a non-binding letter
of intent.
A trust protector is someone who is appointed by the settlor to
act as an advisor to the trustee and who is charged with making
sure that the trustee carries out the settlor's wishes. 44 In some
cases, the consent of the protector may be necessary for the trus-
tee to perform certain acts. 45 In addition, the protector may be
empowered to remove the trustee, change the beneficiaries or even
change the situs of the trust.46
An anti-duress clause prohibits the trustee from complying with
any order imposed upon the settlor, a domestic trustee or the for-
eign trustee. 47 The trust instrument will identify the circum-
stances which will trigger the anti-duress clause, including an or-
der from an American court directed at the trustee. 48 In such
cases, the anti-duress clause may instruct the foreign trustee to
remove any co-trustees who may be subject to personal jurisdic-
tion in an American court. 49 The anti-duress clause will also
40. Brennan, supra note 25, at 768.
41. Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Professional Responsibility Issues Associated with Asset Pro-
tection Trusts, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 561, 568 (2004) [hereinafter Professional Re-
sponsibility].
42. Marty-Nelson, supra note 6, at 61.
43. Eric Henzy, Offshore and "Other" Shore Asset Protection Trusts, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 739, 741 (1999).
44. Lorenzetti, supra note 28, at 149.
45. Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479, 506 (2000) [hereinafter Pallbearers to Liability].
46. Roder, supra note 32, at 1256.
47. Lorenzetti, supra note 28, at 146.
48. Brennan, supra note 25, at 767.
49. Lorenzetti, supra note 28, at 146.
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automatically terminate any powers retained by the settlor over
the trust and transfer them to the foreign trustee. 50
Another common provision is a flight clause, which empowers
the trustee to take whatever actions are necessary in order to pro-
tect the trust's assets against threats of nationalization, expro-
priation or political instability. 51 A flight clause can change the
trustee or authorize the trustee to transfer the trust corpus to an-
other jurisdiction. 52
Finally, the settlor can draft a non-binding letter in which the
settlor expresses his intentions as to the disposition of the trust
property. 53 Although the trustee can theoretically ignore the
settlor's wishes, if this occurs the trust protector can override or
remove the trustee. 54
C. Domestic Asset Protection Trusts
On April 1, 1997, Alaska became the first state to enact asset
protection trust legislation. 55 Delaware enacted similar legisla-
tion on July 9, 1997.56 Since then, Missouri, 57 Nevada, 58 Okla-
homa, 59 Rhode Island, 60 Utah 6' and possibly Colorado 62 have fol-
lowed suit. Statutes in these states typically provide that the
50. Brennan, supra note 25, at 766.
51. Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors'Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 287, 310 (2002).
52. Taylor, supra note 2, at 174.
53. Brown, supra note 5, at 134.
54. Lorenzetti, supra note 28, at 149.
55. Alaska Trust Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.40.110, 13.36.035-13.36.060 (2004).
56. Delaware Qualified Disposition in Trust Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-76
(2001).
57. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.5-505(3) (Supp. 2006).
58. Nevada Spendthrift Trust Act, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 166.010-166.170 (2005).
59. Family Wealth Preservation Trust Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 10-18 (Supp.
2006).
60. Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2-1 to 18-9.2-7 (2003).
61. UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14 (Supp. 2004).
62. In re Baum, 22 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 1994). In the Baum case, the settlor, who was
experiencing marital difficulties, created two irrevocable inter vivos trusts and transferred
his residence and various antiques and other tangible personal property to the trusts.
Baum, 22 F.3d at 1015-16. The purpose of the trusts was to provide for the settlor's chil-
dren by a prior marriage in the event of a divorce. Id. at 1018. The children were the prin-
cipal beneficiaries of the trust, although the settlor retained the right to live in a family
residence that had been transferred to the trusts. Id. at 1015-16. Several years later, the
settlor declared bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy trustee argued that the trusts' assets
should be included in the settlor's bankruptcy estate. Id. at 1016. However, a federal ap-
peals court upheld the validity of both irrevocable inter vivos trusts and refused to include
their assets in the settlor's bankruptcy estate even though the settlor had retained a bene-
ficial interest in the trusts. Id. at 1018-20.
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trust have at least one trustee in the situs state, 63 that the trust
operate under the laws of the host state, 64 that some or all of the
administration of the trust take place in the host state, 65 and that
part or all of the trust property be deposited or held within the
host state. 66 Some of these statutes authorize the trustee to make
discretionary distributions of income or principal to the settlor.
67
In other cases, "trust advisors," including the settlor, have the au-
thority to remove trustees or veto any distributions from the
trust. 68 The settlor may be given a testamentary special power of
appointment over the trust.69 In some states, the settlor may even
retain a mandatory right to receive income (but not principal)
from the trust without losing the protection of the spendthrift pro-
vision. 70 Furthermore, many of these statutes require proof of
actual fraud in fraudulent transfer claims and reject the concept of
constructive fraud. 71 They also have short limitation periods for
fraudulent transfer claims. 72 Finally, several states have also
codified their conflict of law standards by statute. 73
A domestic asset protection trust is similar to an offshore asset
protection trust, but offers domestic substantive and procedural
law and greater convenience. 74 A domestic asset protection trust
also avoids the complications and uncertainties associated with
establishing a trust in a country that may have a foreign language
and a different social culture, political system, legal system and
63. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c)(2) (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(9)(a)
(2001); NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.015(2)(a)-(c) (2005).
64. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(d); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(10)(a); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 166.015(1), 166.070; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2(9)(i); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-
14(1)(a).
65. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c)(4); NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.015(1)(d).
66. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c)(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570 (9)(b); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 166.015(1)(a)-(b); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2(8)(ii); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-
14(1)(a).
67. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110o(b)(2) (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3571,
3572(a) (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.040(1)(b), (2)(b) (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-3;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(2)(e)(iii).
68. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(b)(1) (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §
3570(9)(c)(1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(2)(e)(iv).
69. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(10)(b)(2);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.040(2)(a); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2 (9)(ii)(B); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-
6-14(2)(e)(ii).
70. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(3)(B); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(10)(b).
71. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.010 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(2)(c)(ii).
72. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(d)(1) (4 years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §
3572(b)(2) (4 years); NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.170(a) (2005) (2 years); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-
4(b)(1) (4 years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(2)(c)(i) (3 years).
73. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(e); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 166.015 (2005).
74. Pallbearers to Liability, supra note 45, at 515.
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currency. 75 On the other hand, domestic asset protection trusts
lack some of the key procedural and statutory benefits that pro-
vide a strong anti-litigation foundation to the offshore trusts, as
well as the benefit of being able to exercise some indirect supervi-
sion over the disposition of the trust. 76
II. OFFSHORE ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS IN THE COURTS
In this part of the article, I shall describe the negative treat-
ment accorded offshore asset protection trusts by American courts.
These cases have involved a variety of issues, including fraudulent
transfer laws, jurisdiction and choice of law questions, remedies
and the validity of protective provisions in offshore trusts. In gen-
eral, American courts have done their best to thwart attempts by
settlors to protect themselves against the claims of domestic credi-
tors.
A. Application of Fraudulent Transfer Laws
Fraudulent transfer laws, which exist in every state, prohibit a
debtor from transferring assets in order to hinder, delay or de-
fraud creditors. 77 If a court concludes that a transfer is fraudu-
lent, it will set aside the transfer and allow the creditor to satisfy
the debt from the transferred property. 78  Most states have
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), but some
adhere to the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) or to
the older Statute of Elizabeth. 79
A few states still follow the sixteenth century Statute of Eliza-
beth, which prohibits debtors from transferring their property
with "the intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors or others of
their just and lawful actions."80  The statute requires an actual
intent to defraud,8 1 but allows circumstantial proof of the debtor's
subjective state of mind by means of one or more "badges of
75. Id.
76. John K. Eason, Home from the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust Alternatives
Impact Traditional Estate and Gift Tax Planning Considerations, 52 FLA. L. REV. 41, 63
(2000).
77. Wagenfeld, supra note 29, at 845.
78. Lorenzetti, supra note 28, at 157.
79. Richard W. Nenno, Planning with Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Part 1, 40 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 263, 277 (2005).
80. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 § 1 (1571).
81. Pallbearers to Liability, supra note 45, at 509.
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fraud."82 A badge of fraud is "a fact [that tends] to throw suspi-
cion upon the questioned transaction, excites distrust as to bona
fides, raises an inference that a conveyance is fraudulent, and by
its presence, usually requires a showing of good faith."83 Badges
of fraud include: (1) lack or inadequacy of consideration; (2) a fa-
milial or other close relationship among the parties; (3) the reten-
tion of possession, benefit or use of the property by the debtor; (4)
the financial condition of the debtor before and after the transfer;
(5) the existence or effect of a pattern of transactions or course of
conduct after the onset of financial difficulties; and (6) the general
chronology of events.8 4 In some cases, even a single badge of fraud
may be enough to establish that a transfer is fraudulent. 85
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which was promul-
gated in 1918 by the National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws, protects not only those who are creditors at
the time of the transfer but also extends protection to "future
creditors" of the defendant. 86 The UFCA also recognizes the con-
cept of "constructive fraud," which involves a transaction that
harms the transferor's creditors without regard for the trans-
feror's subjective intent.87 Under the concept of constructive
fraud, the UFCA will invalidate conveyances that occur without
consideration when the debtor is insolvent or becomes insolvent as
a result of the transfer, the debtor is left with a small amount of
capital, and when the debtor intends or believes that he will be
unable to pay his debts.
88
Most states have now adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws in 1984.89 The UFTA allows both present
and future creditors to reach property that was transferred with
actual intent to defraud any creditor of the debtor. 90 The statute
also enumerates various badges of fraud that may be used to
82. Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1045 (2000) [hereinafter Race to the Bottom].
83. In re Estate of Reed, 566 P.2d 587, 589 (Wyo. 1977).
84. Marty-Nelson, supra note 6, at 54.
85. Reed, 566 P.2d at 590.
86. Race to the Bottom, supra note 82, at 1045-46.
87. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4-6 (1918).
88. Id.
89. John E. Sullivan III, Future Creditors and Fraudulent Transfers: When a Claimant
Doesn't Have a Claim, When a Transfer Isn't a Transfer, When Fraud Doesn't Stay Fraudu-
lent, and Other Important Limits to Fraudulent Transfers Law for the Asset Protection
Planner, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 955, 960 (1997).
90. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1) (1999).
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prove the debtor's actual intent.91 Present and future creditors
may also invalidate constructively fraudulent transfers when the
debtor is involved in a business or transaction that would leave
him with a small amount of capital, or when the debtor intended,
believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur
debts that he would be unable to pay. 92 Finally, present (but not
future) creditors may prove that a transfer was fraudulent, re-
gardless of the debtor's intent, if the transfer was made for less
than reasonably equivalent value while the debtor was insolvent,
or if an insolvent debtor made a transfer to an insider for a previ-
ous debt and the insider reasonably believed that the debtor was
insolvent. 9
3
American courts have relied on the badges of fraud and the con-
cept of constructive fraud to conclude that a transfer of property to
an offshore trust was fraudulent. For example, a Wyoming court
employed a "badges of fraud" analysis in Breitenstine v. Breiten-
stine94 to prevent the settlor of an offshore asset protection trust
from withholding assets from his spouse in a divorce proceeding. 95
In that case, Jerald Breitenstine appealed the property division
ordered by the court in conjunction with his divorce, contending
that much of the property that was awarded to his wife was not
marital property. 96 After marital problems began to develop in
1995, Mr. Breitenstine transferred large amounts of marital and
inherited property to the Breitenstine Family Trust that he estab-
lished in the Bahamas. 97 After deciding that property Mr. Breit-
enstine had received from his parents could be awarded to his
spouse,98 the Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether a
fraudulent transfer had occurred when Breitenstine created an
asset protection trust in the Bahamas.99
Wyoming's fraudulent transfer statute, based on the UFCA,
provided that any transfer made with actual intent to hinder, de-
lay, or defraud either present or future creditors would be treated
as fraudulent. 00 The court observed that the determining factor
91. Id. § 4(b).
92. Id. § 4(a)(2).
93. Id. § 5.
94. 62 P.3d 587 (Wyo. 2003).
95. Breitenstine, 62 P.3d at 587.
96. Id. at 589.
97. Id. at 590-93.
98. Id. at 590.
99. Id. at 592-94.
100. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-14-108 (repealed 2006).
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was the husband's intent at the time of the transfer, which could
be proved by circumstantial evidence. 101 The court identified a
number of badges of fraud and concluded that many of them were
present in the circumstances surrounding the creation of Breiten-
stine's offshore trust. 0 2 Specifically, the court noted that the hus-
band would receive all of the trust property when it terminated in
2005 and could name himself as a beneficiary even sooner.10 3 In
addition, the husband retained complete control over the trust by
naming a long-time family friend as trust protector. 10 4 Finally,
the timing of the transfer was suspicious. The husband trans-
ferred most of the family's property to the Bahamas after he and
his wife had separated and were likely to seek a divorce in the
near future. 0 5 For these reasons, the court concluded that Breit-
enstine's transfers to the Bahamian trust in 1995 were fraudu-
lent. 106
In 2003, another American court relied on the concept of con-
structive fraud in Nastro v. D'Onofrio10 7 to uphold the claims of a
domestic creditor where a debtor had transferred property to an
offshore trust. 10 8 The parties owned a company known as U.S.
Propeller Service of California. 10 9 On June 7, 2001, Nastro ob-
tained a judgment in California against D'Onofrio for misappro-
priation of the corporation's funds. 110 On June 21, 2001, D'Onofrio
transferred $650,000 worth of stock in various Connecticut-based
companies to a trust company in the Channel Island of Jersey for
the benefit of his wife and children."' In 2002, Nastro filed an
action in a federal district court in Connecticut, seeking injunctive
relief against D'Onofrio. 112 Nastro alleged that D'Onofrio's trans-
fer of stock to the Jersey trustee without consideration left
D'Onofrio without sufficient assets to pay the California judg-
ment. 113 D'Onofrio sought to dismiss the suit, but the court con-
cluded that there was evidence of constructive fraud under the
101. Breitenstine, 62 P.3d at 592.
102. Id. at 593.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 593-94.
105. Id. at 594.
106. Breitenstine, 62 P.3d at 594.
107. 263 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Conn. 2003).
108. Nastro, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
109. Id. at 448.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 449.
112. Id.
113. Nastro, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
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UFTA. The transfer was gratuitous, it rendered D'Onofrio insol-
vent and unable to pay his debt to Nastro, and the transfer took
place just two weeks after a judgment against D'Onofrio was ren-
dered by the California court. 114 Accordingly, the court granted a
preliminary injunction against D'Onofrio, preserving status quo
during the litigation. 
11 5
A fraudulent transfer statute can be a useful tool for creditors
when the settlor transfers property to an offshore trust. As the
Breitenstine and Nastro cases illustrate, courts that are hostile to
the concept of self-settled spendthrift trusts can employ concepts
like badges of fraud or constructive fraud to characterize transfers
of property to offshore trusts as fraudulent. If the court finds a
transfer to be fraudulent, it can try to force the settlor to repatri-
ate the trust corpus and subject it to creditors' claims.
B. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Issues
In order to reach the assets of an offshore trust, a creditor must
obtain either personal jurisdiction over the foreign trustee (assum-
ing that there is no domestic trustee) or in rem jurisdiction over
the trust property if it is located within the domestic court's juris-
diction. Although lack of jurisdiction has derailed some lawsuits,
American courts have often cooperated with creditors to overcome
jurisdictional problems, particularly when they were able to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over the settlor. American courts have
also been sympathetic to creditors when choice of law issues arise.
Almost without exception, American courts have chosen to apply
the law of the forum instead of the law of the trust situs (where
self-settled spendthrift trusts are recognized), even though the
trust instrument expressly provided that the law of the trust situs
should be applied.
1. Jurisdiction
Due process forbids the imposition of a judgment by a court
unless it has obtained jurisdiction over either the parties or over
the property in dispute. 116 A judgment imposed in violation of
these requirements is void in the state where it is rendered, and
due process forbids recognition and enforcement of such a judg-
114. Id. at 460.
115. Id. at 460-61.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 104 cmt. a (1971).
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ment in any other state as well.117 A court may assert in rem ju-
risdiction when trust property is located in the forum state 18 or it
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a trustee if he or she re-
sides in the forum state. 119 In some cases, a court may also em-
ploy a state's long-arm statute to assert personal jurisdiction over
trustees, even if they do not reside in the forum state.
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington120 is the founda-
tion of modern jurisdictional theory. In that case, the United
States Supreme Court held that a non-resident defendant can be
subject to personal jurisdiction if he has "minimum contacts" with
the forum state and the maintenance of a suit in the forum state
would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."121
The Court's minimum contacts analysis was applied to an out-
of-state trustee in Hanson v. Denckla.122 In that case, the Court
concluded that a Florida court could not exercise jurisdiction over
a Delaware trust that had been established by the settlor while
she was living in Pennsylvania. 123 The settlor retained an income
interest under the trust as well as the right to amend the trust
and to exercise a general power of appointment over the trust cor-
pus. She later moved to Florida and appointed $400,000 from the
trust for the benefit of two of her grandchildren. 124
At her death, the residuary legatees under her will brought suit
in a Florida court to challenge the validity of the Delaware trust.
The Florida Supreme Court ruled in favor of the residuary lega-
tees, 125 but the Delaware Supreme Court refused to recognize the
Florida judgment because it believed that the Florida court lacked
personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee. 126 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Delaware court did
not have to honor the Florida court's ruling on the validity of the
trust because the Florida court failed to obtain either personal
117. Estate of Waitzman, 507 So. 2d 24, 25 (Miss. 1987).
118. Doerr v. Warner, 76 N.W.2d 505, 513 (Minn. 1956).
119. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Alfred Univ., 157 N.E.2d 662, 665 (Mass. 1959).
120. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
121. Int' Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
122. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
123. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 256.
124. Id. at 239.
125. Hanson v. Denckla, 100 So. 2d 378, 385 (Fla. 1956).
126. Lewis v. Hanson, 128 A.2d 819, 834-35 (Del. 1957).
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jurisdiction over the trustee or in rem jurisdiction over the trust
corpus. 127
In its holding, the Court concluded that a probate proceeding in
Florida could not give a Florida court in rem jurisdiction over out-
of-state property so as to affect the rights of non-residents who
were not already subject to the court's personal jurisdiction. 128 In
addition, the Court held that Florida courts could not assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over an out-of-state trustee unless the trustee
had "minimum contacts" with Florida. 129 The minimum contacts
in question had to include some act by which the trustee had pur-
posefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in
Florida. 130 In this case, the Court observed:
The defendant trust company has no office in Florida, and
transacts no business there. None of the trust assets have
ever been held or administered in Florida, and the record dis-
closes no solicitation of business in that State either in person
or by mail. 131
The Hanson case continues to be followed, 132 and under its reason-
ing, it would be difficult for an American court to assert personal
jurisdiction over an offshore trustee as long as the trustee has not
conducted business in the forum state.
Of course, a court may be able to assert in rem jurisdiction over
the corpus of an out-of-state trust even though it cannot obtain
personal jurisdiction over a foreign trustee. However, Shaffer v.
Heitner133 suggests that this strategy may not always work. In
Shaffer, a non-resident plaintiff invoked a Delaware statute to
sequester stock and other securities owned by non-resident defen-
dants but located in that state.134 The Delaware Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the sequestration statute.135 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court held that the minimum contacts
127. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 245. Florida law provided that the trustee in such a case was
an indispensable party. Id.
128. Id. at 247-48.
129. Id. at 253.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 250-54.
132. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ducey, 787 P.2d 749, 752 (Mont. 1990); Dreher v. Smithson
(In re Geroge M. Naylor Revocable Ins. Tr.), 986 P.2d 721, 725 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); Rose v.
Firstar Bank, 819 A.2d 1247, 1255 (R.I. 2003); Frumkin v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla.
(In re Frumkin), 874 S.W.2d 40, 41-43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
133. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
134. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 191-92.
135. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
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standard was applicable to in rem jurisdiction. 136 The Court de-
clared that this standard could be readily satisfied in disputes
over the ownership of property located in the forum state since a
non-resident claimant would expect to benefit from that state's
protection of his interest. 1
37
The Court also observed that in rem jurisdiction may also be
appropriate when a plaintiff is injured on property located in the
forum state but owned by a non-resident.138 However, the Court
distinguished these cases from those where the property is com-
pletely unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action. 139 In this case,
the property sequestered by the Delaware court was not the sub-
ject matter of the litigation, nor was the plaintiffs cause of action
related to the property. 140 The fact that the defendants served as
officers and directors of a corporation chartered in Delaware did
not provide sufficient contacts to give Delaware courts jurisdiction
over them in a stockholders' derivative suit. 4 1 In the absence of
minimum contacts with Delaware, the state courts could not ac-
quire jurisdiction over the defendants simply by attaching their
property. 142
The difficulty of obtaining personal jurisdiction over a foreign
trustee under International Shoe and Hanson is illustrated by Na-
stro v. D'Onofrio.143 In that case, Nastro, who had obtained a
judgment against D'Onofrio in California, asked a federal district
court in Connecticut to set aside the transfer of stock shares in
certain Connecticut-based corporations as fraudulent transfers. 144
Shortly after the California court held in favor of the defendant,
he transferred the corporate stock to the Continental Trust Com-
pany, Ltd., on the Island of Jersey and established the Chana
Trust for the benefit of his wife and children. 145 The defendant
argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed because the court had
not acquired personal jurisdiction over Continental Trust, which
the defendant claimed was an indispensable party under Rule 19
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 146 The court acknowl-
136. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207.
137. Id. at 207-08.
138. Id. at 208.
139. Id. at 208-09.
140. Id. at 213.
141. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213-14.
142. Id. at 216-17.
143. 263 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Conn. 2003).
144. Nastro, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 448-49.
145. Id. at 449.
146. Id.
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edged that Continental Trust was a "necessary" party as that term
is used in Rule 19(a). 147 As the court pointed out, in an action to
set aside a fraudulent conveyance, the transferee of the property
in question is a necessary party because the action to set aside the
transfer necessarily affects the transferee's interest in that prop-
erty.148 Having decided that Continental Trust was a necessary
party, the court declared that it must have personal jurisdiction
over the foreign trustee in order to validly issue an injunction
against it. 149  Consequently, the court needed to determine
whether there was a substantial probability that it would find a
basis for federal jurisdiction over Continental Trust before it could
issue a preliminary injunction against it. 150
Applying the reasoning of Hanson, the court concluded that it
could not exercise jurisdiction over stock certificates located in the
Island of Jersey. 151 Even though the companies were located in
Connecticut, the stock certificates evidencing ownership were lo-
cated in Jersey, thereby foreclosing an assertion of quasi in rem
jurisdiction. 152 Likewise, there was no basis under Hanson for the
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Continental Trust. The
only connection between Continental and the state of Connecticut
was D'Onofrio's unilateral act of settling the trust in Jersey, and
this was not enough to satisfy the minimum contacts standard.
Nor was the fact that the trust corpus was composed of stock in
Connecticut companies sufficient to establish personal jurisdic-
tion. 153 For these reasons, the court granted the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss Continental and the Chana Trust. 15 4 However,
even though the court could not obtain jurisdiction over the for-
eign trustees, it effectively thwarted the settlor's plan by ordering
the Connecticut companies, which were subject to its jurisdiction,
to issue new stock certificates in the creditor's name. 155
Another court took a more favorable view of the jurisdiction is-
sue in Beaubien v. Cambridge Consolidated, Ltd.156 In that case,
the plaintiffs brought suit in a Florida court against Cambridge,
147. Id. at 450. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
148. Nastro, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
149. Id. at 451.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 453.
152. Id.
153. Nastro, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 453.
154. Id. at 453-54.
155. Id. at 456.
156. 652 So. 2d 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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the trustee of a trust established in the Cayman Islands, and
Dwaine Carr, a Florida attorney. The plaintiffs alleged that they
were beneficiaries of the trust and sought an accounting from the
trustee.157 The plaintiffs also claimed that some of the trust's as-
sets had been held in a Florida bank account controlled by Carr
and that these funds disappeared after the lawsuit was filed. 15
8
The court agreed that Carr, as a Florida resident, was subject to
its jurisdiction.159 Carr conceded that he was an officer of Cam-
bridge and provided legal services for the company, but main-
tained that Cambridge had never done any business in Florida,
had no office in Florida, and had no agency or presence in the
state. 160 Nevertheless, the court declared that there was a factual
dispute over whether Carr was merely an attorney for Cambridge
or whether he acted as an active manager or agent for Cambridge
in Florida. 161 Therefore, the court concluded that the complaint
against Cambridge should not have been dismissed for lack of ju-
risdiction. 1
62
It seems clear that no domestic court could obtain personal ju-
risdiction over an offshore trustee as long as it did not conduct
business in the forum state. 163 The settlor of an offshore asset
protection trust could also defeat a creditor's attempt to assert in
rem jurisdiction by removing all tangible trust property from the
forum state. Finally, a creditor will not benefit from obtaining
personal jurisdiction over the settlor as long as the settlor has not
retained control over the offshore trust. An important exception to
this is when the settlor has filed for bankruptcy. As the discussion
below will show, once a bankruptcy court has obtained personal
jurisdiction over a settlor, it can force the settlor to repatriate
trust property by declaring it to be part of the settlor's bankruptcy
estate and by withholding a discharge from bankruptcy until the
property is returned.
2. Choice of Law Issues
Assuming that a court has jurisdiction over either the trustee or
the trust property, it must decide whether to apply the law of the
157. Beaubien, 652 So. 2d at 937.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 940.
161. Id.
162. Beaubien, 652 So. 2d at 940.
163. Race to the Bottom, supra note 82, at 1091.
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forum state, the law of the trust situs, or the law of some other
jurisdiction in order to determine what rights a domestic creditor
has against the trust's assets. When the creditor claims that a
transfer to an out-of-state trust is fraudulent, the forum state will
usually apply its own law.164 However, the choice of law issue is
less clear when the transfer is not fraudulent and the case turns
on the enforceability of an offshore trust's spendthrift provisions.
Conflict of law principles in cases involving the validity or con-
struction of an inter vivos trust are fairly well-settled. For trusts
in land, these issues are usually determined according to the law
of the trust situs.165 For trusts of moveable assets, the law desig-
nated by the settlor will normally apply. 166 However, the forum
court may disregard the settlor's wishes if it concludes that the
foreign law violates the forum state's public policy.167 This princi-
ple is illustrated by In re Brooks.168 In the summer of 1990,
Brooks transferred stock certificates of various Connecticut corpo-
rations to his wife, who immediately thereafter used them to fund
irrevocable trusts in Jersey and Bermuda. 169 Each trust named
Brooks as the sole income beneficiary and also allowed the trustee
to make discretionary distributions of principal to Brooks as
well.170 The trusts contained spendthrift provisions and provided
that the law of the trust situs would apply to the trust. 171
In late 1991, creditors filed an involuntary chapter 7 petition for
bankruptcy against Brooks, later converted to a voluntary pro-
ceeding under chapter 11.172 The bankruptcy trustee sought a
ruling from the court that the assets in the two offshore trusts
were part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate because they were self-
settled and, therefore, ineffective against creditors.173 Brooks, on
the other hand, contended that the trusts were not self-settled
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAw § 249(2)(b) (1971).
165. Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U.S. 542, 546 (1884); Hartsfield v. Lescher, 721 F. Supp.
1052, 1056 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 268(1); Hutchinson v. Ross, 187
N.E. 65 (N.Y. 1933).
167. James v. Powell, 225 N.E.2d 741, 747 (N.Y. 1967); Clare v. Clark (In re Estate of
Clark), 236 N.E.2d 152, 156-57 (N.Y. 1968); Hemingway v. McGehee (In re Estate of Crich-
ton), 228 N.E.2d 799, 805-08 (N.Y. 1967).
168. Brooks v. Sattin, 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
169. Brooks, 217 B.R. at 101.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 100.
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because they were established by his wife, and, therefore, the
spendthrift provisions were effective against creditors. 174
The court declared that because a federal court must apply the
choice of law rules of the forum state in which it sits, Connecticut
choice of law rules would control. 175 The court acknowledged that
Connecticut courts usually respect the settlor's intent as to what
law is applicable to a trust, but observed that "the legality of trust
personalty [is determined] by the law of the settlor's domicile."'
176
In addition, the court observed that Connecticut courts would not
enforce the law of another jurisdiction which contravened the pub-
lic policy of the state. 177 Applying these criteria, the court ruled
that the enforceability of the trusts' spendthrift provisions would
be determined under Connecticut law and not the law of Bermuda
or Jersey.17 8 Not surprisingly, the court concluded that the trusts
were self-settled, even though the debtor's wife was the settlor,
because the debtor actually provided the funds that were trans-
ferred from his wife to the trusts. 179 Furthermore, the court held
that under Connecticut law, the spendthrift provisions would not
bar creditors' claims.18 0 Consequently, the court ruled that prop-
erty in the offshore trusts would be treated as part of the debtor's
bankruptcy estate. '8 '
Occasionally, choice of law analysis involves a two-step process.
First, the court must determine whether to apply the choice of law
rules of the forum state or some other jurisdiction. Having de-
cided which choice of law rules control, the court must then ana-
lyze them to determine which jurisdiction's substantive law is ap-
plicable. This two-step process was utilized by a bankruptcy court
in Portnoy v. Marine Midland Bank. 8 2 In that case, the court was
required to decide whether to apply New York law or that of the
Island of Jersey to determine what interest, if any, the debtor re-
tained in an offshore trust. 8 3 Portnoy, the sole shareholder and
president of Mary Drawers, Inc., had agreed to assume personal
liability for any loans Marine Midland Bank made to the com-
174. Brooks, 217 B.R. at 100.
175. Id. at 101.
176. Id. (quoting Stetson v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 164 A.2d 239 (Conn. 1960)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 101-02.
179. Brooks, 217 B.R. at 102.
180. Id. at 103-04.
181. Id. at 104.
182. 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
183. Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 696-97.
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pany.18 4 Relying on this guarantee, Midland Marine loaned Mary
Drawers more than $1 million in 1988.185 Late in 1989, Mary
Drawers defaulted on the loan, and in 1991 the company declared
bankruptcy.186 In 1990, Midland Marine sued Portnoy on his
guarantee, and in 1995 Portnoy declared bankruptcy. 8 7 Midland
Marine argued that Portnoy should be denied a discharge in bank-
ruptcy under sections 727(a)(2)(A) and 727(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy
Code because he had deliberately concealed his assets by failing to
disclose the existence of the offshore trusts. 188
Midland Marine relied on the "continuous concealment" doctrine
to oppose Portnoy's discharge. 8 9 Under this theory, a bankruptcy
court can find that a concealment existed within a year of bank-
ruptcy even if the initial concealment took place more than a year
before bankruptcy, provided the debtor allowed the property to
remain concealed into the critical year. 90 Since Portnoy trans-
ferred the property to the offshore trust in 1989 but did not file for
bankruptcy until 1995, if Portnoy effectively divested himself of
any interest in the transferred property more than one year before
declaring bankruptcy, section 727(a)(2)(A) would not apply.
As the court pointed out, "local law" would determine whether
Portnoy retained an interest in the offshore trust. 191 The question
was whether the applicable local law was that of New York or that
of the Island of Jersey, where the trust was located. 192 First, the
court considered whether to apply federal choice of law principles
or those of the forum state, New York. 193 As it turned out, under
both federal common law and that of New York, the court was di-
rected to apply the substantive law of the jurisdiction having the
greatest interest in the litigation. 194 Portnoy argued that the law
of the Island of Jersey should determine whether he had any in-
terest in the trust because Jersey was the situs of the trust, the
trust instrument called for Jersey law to be applied, and the trus-
tee was a Jersey resident. 195 On the other hand, both Portnoy and
184. Id. at 688-89.
185. Id. at 689.
186. Id. at 690-91.
187. Id. at 691.
188. Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 688 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A), (a)(4) (2000)).
189. Id. at 695.
190. Id. (citing Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 1531 (3d Cir. 1993)).
191. Id. at 696.
192. Id.
193. Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 697.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 698.
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his creditors resided in the United States and it was reasonable to
expect that American, not foreign, law would govern. 196 The court
decided that New York had a greater interest than Jersey in de-
termining whether Portnoy had retained and concealed a property
interest in the trust. 197
Applying New York law, the court concluded that Portnoy had a
property interest in the offshore trust.198 The court went on to
hold that giving effect to a self-settled spendthrift trust would of-
fend New York law even though the trust was valid in Jersey. 199
Accordingly, the court concluded that the trust assets were part of
the bankruptcy estate and refused to grant a discharge to Portnoy
until it could determine whether he intended to "hinder, delay, or
defraud" his creditors when he transferred property to the Jersey
trust and whether that intent continued into the one-year pre-
petition period. 200
As Brooks and Portnoy illustrate, the strongly held bias against
self-settled spendthrift trusts has led a number of American
courts to apply choice of law rules in a way that eliminates any
realistic chance that offshore asset protection trusts will be recog-
nized domestically, regardless of whether they are valid in the
jurisdiction where they were created.
C. Protective Devices
As discussed earlier, offshore asset protection trust instruments
usually contain a number of provisions that are designed to pre-
vent creditors from enforcing judgments obtained in American
courts against a foreign trustee. These include provisions for the
appointment of trust protectors, anti-duress clauses, and flight
clauses. As one might expect, American courts have generally
done their best to undermine the effectiveness of these devices.
1. Trust Protectors
A trust protector is someone who is appointed by the settlor to
act as an advisor to the trustee and to ensure that the trustee car-
ries out the settlor's wishes. 20 1 However, the use of a trust protec-
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 699.
199. Id. at 699-701.
200. Id. at 701.
201. Trust Protectors, supra note 34, at 2764.
Duquesne Law Review
tor device has sometimes backfired and enabled courts to impute
control over the trust to the settlor when he has named himself or
a family member as trust protector.202
For example, in Federal Trade Commission v. Affordable Media,
LLC, the court concluded that the settlors had retained control of
their offshore trust because they made themselves trust protec-
tors. 20 3 In 1995, Michael and Denyse Anderson established an
irrevocable trust in the Cook Islands, naming themselves as trus-
tees along with AsiaCiti Trust Limited, a company that was li-
censed to provide trust services in the Cook Islands. 20 4 For good
measure, the Andersons also named themselves as protectors of
the trust. 20 5 As trust protectors, the Andersons had the power to
appoint new trustees and to make the final decision as to when
the trust's anti-duress clause should be invoked. 20 6 In 1997, the
Andersons formed a telemarketing company, Financial Growth
Consultants, to sell "media units" to the public. 20 7 In fact, the
Anderson's marketing operation was found to be an elaborate
Ponzi scheme that defrauded thousands of investors. 208 The An-
dersons received an estimated $6.3 million in sales commissions
while those who purchased media units from them lost their in-
vestments.
209
In 1998, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) charged the An-
dersons with participating in a scheme to market fraudulent in-
vestments to consumers. 210 At the request of the FTC, a federal
district court in Nevada issued a restraining order, followed by a
preliminary injunction, requiring the Andersons to repatriate any
assets held for their benefit outside of the United States. 211 In
.response to the restraining order, the Andersons sent a letter to
AsiaCiti in the Cook Islands, instructing the trustee to provide an
accounting of the trust and to repatriate the trust's assets to the
United States. 212 Not surprisingly, AsiaCiti concluded that the
202. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999); Breit-
enstine v. Breitenstine, 62 P.3d 587, 593-94 (Wyo. 2003); Walker v. Weese, 286 B.R. 294 (D.
Md. 2002); Colburn v. Peoples Bank of Charles Town (In re Colburn), 145 B.R. 851, 859
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
203. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1228.
204. Id. at 1232.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1242.
207. Id. at 1231.
208. Race to the Bottom, supra note 82, at 1101.
209. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1232.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1232.
Vol. 45172
Winter 2007 The Offshore Asset Protection Trust
court order was an "event of duress" which authorized it to remove
the Andersons as co-trustees, refuse to repatriate the trust's as-
sets and refuse to provide an accounting.213 The Andersons main-
tained that once they were removed as trustees, they could not
compel AsiaCiti to comply with the injunction. 214 However, the
district court refused to believe the Andersons and imprisoned
them for civil contempt. 215 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling. 216
Rejecting the Andersons' impossibility claim, the appeals court
focused on their status as trust protectors. The court pointed out
that the trust enabled the protectors to appoint new trustees and
also gave them the power to conclusively determine whether an
event of duress had occurred. 217 According to the court, the An-
dersons could have overruled AsiaCiti's determination that the
preliminary injunction constituted an event of duress, and they
also could have directed the trustee to repatriate the trust's assets
to the United States. 218 As the court observed, the Andersons
were no doubt aware of this power because shortly after the re-
straining order was issued, they made a belated attempt to resign
as trust protectors. 219 While their appeal was pending, the district
court released the Andersons from custody, but ruled that they
remained in contempt of court. 220 Following the appeal, the FTC
brought an action against AsiaCiti in the Cook Islands. 22' The
parties ultimately settled, and AsiaCiti transferred $1.2 million
from the Andersons' trust to the FTC.
222
As the Andersons discovered, the trust protector device can be a
double-edged sword. If the settlor is also the trust protector, an
American court can order him to direct the foreign trustee to repa-
triate the trust's assets. 223 This could also occur if a trust protec-
tor, such as a friend or relative of the settlor, is subject to the
court's jurisdiction. To protect against such actions by American
courts, the trust protector's powers should be formulated as nega-
tive powers, that is, the power to veto acts or decisions of the for-
213. Id.
214. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1230.
215. Id. at 1233.
216. Id. at 1244.
217. Id. at 1242.
218. Id. at 1243 n.13.
219. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1243.
220. Id. at 1233.
221. Professional Responsibility, supra note 41, at 587.
222. Id.
223. Trust Protectors, supra note 34, at 2764.
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eign trustee, and not affirmative powers, such as the right to ap-
point new trustees or transfer the trust's assets.22
4
2. Anti-Duress Clauses
An anti-duress clause prohibits a foreign trustee from complying
with any order imposed upon the settlor, a domestic trustee or the
foreign trustee by an American court. 225 As one might expect,
American courts do not take kindly to anti-duress clauses. For
example, in Lawrence v. Goldberg,226 a bankruptcy court deter-
mined that the corpus of an offshore trust located in Mauritius
was part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate and ordered him to
turn over the trust property to the bankruptcy trustee.227 Later, a
federal appeals court upheld the district court's finding that the
anti-duress clause was void as to current and future creditors un-
der Florida law because it was part of an invalid self-settled
spendthrift trust. 228 The court stated that the sole purpose of the
anti-duress clause was to enable Lawrence to evade liability for
contempt while merely feigning compliance with the court's or-
der. 229 The court further declared that the validation of such a
clause in these circumstances "would contravene public policy pro-
scribing a debtor from shielding money placed in Trust for his or
her own benefit and to the prejudice of legitimate creditors."230
In Affordable Media, a temporary restraining order issued
against the Andersons induced their Cook Island trustee to invoke
the trust's anti-duress clause and remove them as co-trustees. 231
This action removed the Andersons as trustees, thereby leaving
AsiaCiti in sole control over the trust as the remaining trustee.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the Andersons still re-
tained the ability to repatriate the trust's assets to the United
States through the exercise of their powers as trust protectors. 232
Although the anti-duress clause is a potentially useful tool, if
the settlor reserves the power to overrule the trustee's decision to
224. Gideon Rothschild, Establishing and Drafting Offshore Asset Protection Trusts, 23
EST. PLAN. 65, 70 (1996); but see Trust Protectors, supra note 34, at 2765 (discussing the
disadvantages of limiting the protector to negative powers).
225. Lorenzetti, supra note 28, at 146.
226. 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002).
227. Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1297.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1299.
231. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1999).
232. Affordable Media, 170 F.3d at 1242.
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invoke the anti-duress clause, an American court may order him
to do so and hold him in contempt if he fails to comply with the
court's order. To prevent this from happening, the trustee or the
trust protector (who is not within the court's jurisdiction), not the
settlor, must have the sole right to trigger the anti-duress clause.
3. Flight Clauses
Another common provision is a flight clause, which empowers
the trustee to take whatever actions are necessary in order to pro-
tect the trust's assets against threats of nationalization, expro-
priation or political instability in the situs jurisdiction.233 A flight
clause was involved in Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Brennan.234 The settlor, Robert Brennan, owned and operated
First Jersey Securities, Inc., a discount brokerage house that spe-
cialized in the underwriting, trading and distribution of low-priced
securities. 235 The SEC brought an action against Brennan, alleg-
ing that he had defrauded First Jersey customers by inducing
them to buy securities at excessive prices. 236 In 1995, a federal
district court held in favor of the SEC and ordered Brennan and
First Jersey to disgorge approximately $75 million in illegal prof-
its.237 Almost immediately thereafter, Brennan filed for bank-
ruptcy. 23
8
Sometime during the trial, Brennan established an offshore as-
set protection trust, named the Cardinal Trust, in Gibraltar and
funded it with $5 million in municipal bonds. 239 Brennan named
his children and the Robert E. Brennan Foundation as trust bene-
ficiaries; however, the trustee was not required to make any pay-
ments to these beneficiaries during the life of the trust. 240 The
trust was to terminate at the end of ten years, at which time the
trust corpus would revert to Brennan.241 In response to the bank-
ruptcy trustee's efforts to recover the assets of the Cardinal Trust,
the trust changed its situs from Gibraltar to Mauritius and then
233. Danforth, supra note 51, at 310.
234. 230 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2000).
235. Brennan, 230 F.3d at 67.
236. Id. at 67-68.
237. Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1185, 1213 (S.D.N.Y.
1995), affd in part & rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996).
238. Brennan, 230 F.3d at 68.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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from Mauritius to Nevis. 242 These moves were prompted by the
trust's flight clause, which required the trustee to relocate the
trust upon the occurrence of government action in any part of the
world that attempts to take control of the trust assets or "any or-
der, decree or judgment of any court . . . which will or may . . . in
any way control, restrict or prevent the free disposal" of trust
property.243 Nevis proved to be a safe haven for Brennan; when
the bankruptcy trustee brought suit to recover the trust's assets,
the High Court of St. Kitts and Nevis dismissed the action. 244
Brennan also won a temporary victory when the appeals court
concluded that the lower court's repatriation order violated the
automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 245
D. Remedial Powers
American courts have also made use of their remedial powers to
circumvent the protection afforded to debtors by offshore asset
protection trusts. For example, bankruptcy courts have refused to
discharge debtors from bankruptcy, and other courts have invoked
their civil contempt power to force debtors to repatriate property
held in offshore trusts.
1. Withholding Discharge from Bankruptcy
Even when a bankruptcy court cannot obtain jurisdiction over a
foreign trustee, it can put pressure on a settlor who has filed for
bankruptcy. Thus, a bankruptcy court denied a discharge to a
debtor in Colburn v. Peoples Bank of Charles Town. 246 In Colburn,
the debtor made seven false statements under oath relating to
prior businesses, two bank accounts, transfers of stock and cattle,
oil and gas interests, tax refunds, claims for unpaid salary, and
sources of income during 1987 and 1988.247 He also failed to dis-
close his reversionary interest in a Bermuda trust.248 Applying
the provisions of section 727(a)(4) to these facts, the court con-
cluded that the debtor acted with fraudulent intent and denied
him a discharge. 249 The court also justified denial of a discharge
242. Id.
243. Brennan, 230 F.3d at 68-69.
244. Id. at 69.
245. Id. at 75.
246. 145 B.R. 851 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
247. Colburn, 145 B.R. at 858.
248. Id. at 859.
249. Id. at 857-59 (citing 11 U.C.S. § 727(a)(4) (2000)).
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on the concealment provisions of section 727(a)(2), concluding that
the debtor's failure to disclose the existence of the Bermuda trust
was based on an intent to hinder or delay creditors. 250 Finally, the
court found that a denial of discharge was justified by section
727(a)(3) for failure to keep or preserve records from which his
financial condition may be ascertained. 2 1 When the trust was
discovered, Colburn claimed that he could not provide a copy of
the trust agreement, thereby making it impossible to determine
what control he had over the trust or what interest he had in the
trust's assets.
252
2. Civil Contempt
Some courts have even used their contempt power to circumvent
an offshore trust's protective devices. In Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Affordable Media, LLC, the FTC sought to recover millions
of dollars that Michael and Denyse Anderson had transferred to a
trust in the Cook Islands. 253 When the Andersons claimed that
they could not comply with a preliminary injunction requiring
them to repatriate the trust property, the district court held them
in civil contempt and ordered them to be incarcerated. 254 On ap-
peal, the federal circuit court stated that the party seeking con-
tempt must show by clear and convincing evidence that the defen-
dants violated a specific and definite order of the court. 255 Once
that burden was met, the defendants had to demonstrate why
they were unable to comply. 256 However, the court added, in the
case of an asset protection trust, "the burden on the party assert-
ing an impossibility defense will be particularly high because of
the likelihood that any attempted compliance with the court's or-
ders will be merely a charade rather than a good faith effort to
comply."
257
On the other hand, the Andersons contended that the trust's
anti-duress clause prevented them from complying with the
court's order. 258 The clause provided that the Andersons would
automatically be removed as co-trustees if an event of duress oc-
250. Id. at 859 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)).
251. Id. at 861 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3)).
252. Colburn, 145 B.R. at 861.
253. 179 F.3d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 1999).
254. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1233.
255. Id. at 1239.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1241.
258. Id. at 1240.
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curred. 259 However, the court ruled that the impossibility defense
was not applicable because the Andersons could comply with the
preliminary injunction, notwithstanding the duress clause, by ex-
ercising their powers as trust protectors. 260 As the court pointed
out, the Andersons could nullify the determination of the Cook
Islands trustee that an event of duress had occurred and direct
the trustee to repatriate the trust property to the United States. 261
Consequently, the appeals court affirmed the lower court's ruling
that the Andersons' failure to comply with the preliminary injunc-
tion constituted contempt of court.
262
Another court used its contempt power to coerce a settlor to re-
turn the corpus of an offshore trust in Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Bilzerian.263 In Bilzerian, the defendant was con-
victed of engaging in securities fraud and ordered to disgorge $62
million in illegal profits and accrued interest. 264 Instead, Bilze-
rian transferred much of his property to an asset protection trust
that he had established in the Cook Islands.265 When Bilzerian
claimed that he was unable to provide copies of the trust instru-
ments or other financial documents, the court held him in civil
contempt. 266 Further, the court rejected Bilzerian's claim that he
could not compel the Cook Islands trustee to comply with the
court's order. 267
Bilzerian also argued that the automatic stay provision of the
Bankruptcy Code prevented the district court from enforcing its
contempt order. 268 This provision provides that almost all pro-
ceedings against a debtor are stayed upon his declaration of bank-
ruptcy.269 The court, however, declared that the contempt pro-
ceeding was not subject to the automatic stay provision because
two exceptions were applicable: (1) the exception for a governmen-
tal unit to exercise its police powers and (2) the exception to up-
hold the dignity of the court and vindicate the court's authority to
enforce its orders.
270
259. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1240.
260. Id. at 1242.
261. Id. at 1243.
262. Id. at 1243-44.
263. 131 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2001).
264. Bilzerian, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
265. Id. at 16.
266. Id. at 16-18.
267. Id. at 16.
268. Id. at 14.
269. Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
270. Bilzerian, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 14.
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The first exception was applicable because the court's order
merely required the debtor to provide an accounting of his assets
in order to purge himself of contempt and did not constitute a
money judgment against him.271 The court also found that the
second exception was applicable because the purpose of the con-
tempt proceeding was to vindicate the integrity of the court.
272
The court observed that the defendant had violated two direct or-
ders of the court and had not complied with the court's temporary
purgation requirements. 273 In the court's view, it had the inherent
power to ensure that Bilzerian complied with its orders. 274 There-
fore, the court concluded that the automatic stay provision was
not applicable and ordered Bilzerian's incarceration until he pro-
vided the required information about the Cook Islands trust. 275
A final example of the use of civil contempt against a recalci-
trant settlor is Goldberg v. Lawrence.276 Prior to October 19, 1987,
known in the securities industry as "Black Monday," the defen-
dant, Lawrence, had been a successful options trader who used
Bear, Stearns & Co. ("Bear Stearns") as his trading clearing-
house. 277 Following the stock market crash, Bear Stearns at-
tempted to force Lawrence to pay the deficit in his margin ac-
count. 278 In 1991, an arbitrator awarded Bear Stearns more than
$20 million against Lawrence and some of his trading compa-
nies. 279 During the arbitration, Lawrence established a trust in
the Jersey Channel Islands. 280 A month later, he amended the
trust to provide that it would be governed by the law of Mauri-
tius. 28 1 Lawrence filed for bankruptcy in June, 1997.282 In 1999,
the bankruptcy trustee obtained an order directing Lawrence to
turn over the assets of the offshore trust.28 3 When Lawrence
failed to comply with the court's order, he was held in contempt
and incarcerated. 284
271. Id.
272. Id. at 15.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Bilzerian, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
276. 227 B.R. 907, 911 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998).
277. Goldberg, 227 B.R. at 911.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 911-12.
280. Id. at 910.
281. Id.
282. In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002).
283. Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1297.
284. Id.
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The federal appeals court confirmed that the bankruptcy court
had the power to imprison Lawrence for contempt of court when
he failed to comply with a Turn Over Order. 285  The court de-
clared that once a proper showing of a violation of the order was
made, the burden of production shifted to the defendant, who
must go beyond a mere assertion of inability and establish that he
has made, in good faith, all reasonable efforts to meet the terms of
the court order.286 The court then reviewed the terms of the trust,
which according to Lawrence made it impossible for him to force
the foreign trustee to turn over the trust's assets to the bank-
ruptcy trustee. Although Lawrence, in his capacity as settlor,
could appoint or remove trustees, the trust, as amended, con-
tained an anti-duress clause that provided that this power could
not be exercised under duress or coercion. 28 7
Lawrence contended that he had tried to remove the Mauritian
trustee and appoint the bankruptcy trustee as trustee of the off-
shore trust, but the Mauritian trustee had apparently invoked the
anti-duress clause and ignored Lawrence's order. 288 In any event,
the court held that Lawrence's last-minute appointment of the
bankruptcy trustee fell short of the requirement that he make "in
good faith all reasonable efforts" to comply with the court's or-
der. 28 9 In the court's view, Lawrence knew that the Mauritian
trustee would ignore his request. 290 The court also made it clear
that it believed that Lawrence continued to maintain control over
the trust despite the fact that he had apparently divested himself
of any beneficial interest in it.291
Finally, the appeals court declared that Lawrence could not
raise an impossibility defense because the impossibility, if one ex-
285. Id. (citing In re Hardy, 97 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1996)). A "turn over order" is an
order issued by a bankruptcy court which directs the debtor, or one who controls property,
to turn over property that is part of the bankruptcy estate to the bankruptcy trustee. This
procedure is authorized by section 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which declares that:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity, other
than a custodian, in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property
that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that
the debtor may exempt under section 522 of this title, shall deliver to the trus-
tee, and account for, such property or the value of such property, unless such
property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1994).
286. Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1297.
287. Id. at 1296.
288. Id. at 1299-1300.
289. Id. at 1300.
290. Id.
291. Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1299.
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isted, was entirely self-created. 292 Lawrence argued that the self-
created impossibility exception only applied to conditions that
arose after the commencement of the legal action, and in his case,
the trust provisions were implemented several years prior to the
filing of his bankruptcy petition. 293 However, the court rejected
this reasoning, declaring that Lawrence had set up the offshore
trust in anticipation of an expected adverse arbitration award
against him by Bear Stearns.
294
The contempt power is an effective weapon to use against
settlors. The only way for settlors to avoid the risk of being held
in contempt is to divest themselves of any formal control over the
trust before any creditor's claims have been made and to put their
"trust" in the good faith of the foreign trustee. Even then, some
courts may refuse to recognize an impossibility defense when the
impossibility is self-created.
3. Other Remedies
In Nastro v. D'Onofrio,295 the defendant transferred ownership
of his shares in several Connecticut-based companies to an asset
protection trust located in the Island of Jersey. 296 Nastro, a credi-
tor, asked a federal district court to set aside the transfer so that
he could enforce a California judgment against the defendant by
levying against the shares. 297 Nastro also requested the court to
issue a preliminary injunction against the foreign trustee. 298 The
court, however, ruled that Connecticut's long-arm statute would
not confer personal jurisdiction over the trustee or quasi-in rem
jurisdiction over stock certificates located in Jersey. 299
Fortunately for Nastro, the court also concluded that it did have
the power to order a Connecticut corporation to delete the trustee
as owner of the stock in the corporate ledger and issue new stock
certificates in the name of Nastro. 300 The court also declared that
the "[c]ourts have a responsibility to remedy wrongful conduct,
and have, recently, cast a discerning eye at the substantiality of
292. Id. at 1300 (citing Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 799 F.2d 1510, 1521
(11th Cir. 1986)).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. 263 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Conn. 2003).
296. Nastro, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 449 (D. Conn. 2003).
297. Id. at 449.
298. Id. at 450.
299. Id. at 453.
300. Id. at 455.
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off-shore spendthrift trusts in order to find the proverbial 'chink in
the armor."' 301 Finally, the court observed that this remedy would
not be unfair to the parties because either the trustee or the trust
beneficiaries would have standing to contest the action and assert
any defenses they might have to the creditor's fraudulent transfer
claim. 302 In effect, the court overcame its lack of jurisdiction by
forcing the offshore trustee to submit to its jurisdiction if it
wanted to preserve the trust's beneficial interest in the Connecti-
cut-based companies' stock.
III. A PROPOSED RULE FOR OFFSHORE ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS
A. Judicial Hostility to Offshore Asset Protection Trusts
In general, American courts have taken a dim view of offshore
protection trusts. For example, in Affordable Media, the court
declared that "[t]he 'asset protection' aspect of these foreign trusts
arises from the ability of people, such as the Andersons, to frus-
trate and impede the United States courts by moving their assets
beyond those courts' jurisdictions." 30 3 The court went on to sug-
gest that, given the nature of asset protection trusts, it would be
reluctant to accept an impossibility defense to a contempt charge.
According to the court, "[g]iven that these offshore trusts operate
by means of frustrating domestic courts' jurisdiction, we are un-
sure that we would find that the Andersons' inability to comply
with the district court's order is a defense to a civil contempt
charge." 30
4
A federal appeals court took a similar approach when it refused
to recognize the effectiveness of an anti-duress clause.30 5 The
court observed that "[tihe sole purpose of this provision appears to
be an aid to the settlor to evade contempt while merely feigning
compliance with the court's order" and further stated that "the
validation of such a provision would contravene public policy pro-
scribing a debtor from shielding money placed in a Trust for his or
her own benefit and to the prejudice of legitimate creditors."30 6
Another court declared that "[w]hile such trusts may have bene-
fits in asset protection, the use of such trusts to avoid alimony,
301. Nastro, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 456.
302. Id.
303. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1999).
304. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1240.
305. In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002).
306. Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1299.
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child support, and a fair division of marital property upon divorce
is reprehensible to us."30
7
Although many of the settlors involved in these cases had en-
gaged in fraudulent transfers or worse, the hostility of American
courts to offshore protection trusts seems to be based more on the
concept of asset protection, at least in this form, than it does on
the bad faith of debtors. I believe that this hostility is unjustified.
Many of the arguments traditionally made against self-settled
spendthrift trusts, both domestic and foreign, are weak and incon-
sistent. In addition, American courts have generally overlooked
the useful social purposes that asset protection trusts can serve.
B. Arguments for Not Recognizing Self-Settled Spendthrift
Trusts
American courts have consistently refused to protect property in
offshore asset protection trusts against the claims of domestic
creditors. The principal reason for this is they believe that these
offshore trusts are nothing more than a form of self-settled spend-
thrift trust. The rule in most American states is that debtors can-
not insulate themselves from the claims of creditors by placing
their property in domestic self-settled spendthrift trusts. 30 8
Therefore, before deciding how to treat offshore trusts, it may be
useful to consider why American courts look with disfavor upon
attempts by settlors to establish domestic spendthrift trusts.
One justification for the rule against self-settled spendthrift
trusts is the notion that "[y]ou should keep your promises and pay
your debts because it is the right thing to do."30 9 Of course, this
begs the question of why it is right to keep one's promises and pay
one's debts. One basis for this obligation is consent. One who has
voluntarily assumed contractual obligations should not be able to
avoid fulfilling these obligations by hiding behind a self-created
legal barrier. On the other hand, this rationale does not seem to
apply to "involuntary" creditors, such as alimony and child sup-
port claimants or tort victims. Perhaps one can argue that mar-
riage and parenthood are "voluntary" relationships, at least in the
beginning, and that one who marries or becomes a parent impli-
edly consents to assume the burdens and obligations associated
with such relationships. However, even if that is so, the consent
307. Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 62 P.2d 587, 593 (Wyo. 2003).
308. Sjuggerud, supra note 4, at 979.
309. Boxx, supra note 3, at 1259.
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rationale provides little support for tort creditors who wish to
reach assets that have been placed in a self-settled spendthrift
trust.
At first blush, corrective justice seems to be a better rationale
than consent for rejecting self-settled spendthrift trusts. Correc-
tive justice is concerned with rectifying wrongful gains and
losses. 310 This rationale is fairly strong where the claimants are
victims of theft and fraud. In such cases, where the defendant has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, principles of
corrective justice support the return of property to the plaintiff
that the defendant has obtained fraudulently or illegally. The cor-
rective justice argument, however, does not seem very compelling
in the case of alimony or child support claims because the claim-
ants are not seeking the return of property that the defendant has
wrongfully taken from them. This rationale does not provide
much support for tort victims either, particularly when the defen-
dant has not obtained an economic benefit at their expense.
A second justification for the rule is that self-settled spendthrift
trusts are inherently fraudulent. According to commentator
George Bogert, if self-settled spendthrift trusts were enforceable it
would:
give unexampled opportunity to unscrupulous persons to shel-
ter their property before engaging in speculative business en-
terprises, to mislead creditors into thinking that the settlor
still owned the property since he appeared to be receiving its
income, and thereby work a gross fraud on creditors who
might place reliance on the former prosperity and financial
stability of the debtor. 311
However, this "fraud on creditors" rationale is incomplete because
it does not apply to involuntary creditors who take their debtors as
they find them.312 More importantly, the risk of fraud seems over-
rated. Prudent creditors can avoid deatbeats by investigating the
finances of prospective debtors more carefully, and fraudulent
transfer statutes offer additional protection against fraud. 313
The final justification for the rule against enforcement of self-
settled spendthrift trusts is that they undermine the deterrent
310. Allan L. Calnan, Distributive and Corrective Justice Issues in Contemporary To-
bacco Litigation, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 577, 602-03 (1998).
311. GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 40 (6th ed. 1987).
312. Wagenfeld, supra note 29, at 843.
313. Boxx, supra note 3, at 1255.
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effect of civil liability. According to Professor Lynn Lopucki, gov-
ernments enforce legal rules by criminal sanctions and civil liabil-
ity. 314 Speaking of the civil liability system, Professor Lopucki has
declared:
The liability system enforces liability through the entry and
forcible collection of judgments for the payment of money.
Although liability is most closely associated with products li-
ability and other tort actions, money judgments are also the
means of enforcing contracts, civil rights, labor and employ-
ment law, environmental regulations, federal tax law, intel-
lectual property law, most kinds of property rights, and just
about every other kind of law on the books.
315
However, Professor Lopucki believes that the existing system by
which money judgments are enforced is beginning to fail as more
and more potential defendants are developing ways to make
themselves judgment proof, thereby achieving immunity from the
deterrent aspects of the civil liability system. 316 If individuals can
protect against civil liability by transferring their property to a
spendthrift trust, a "moral hazard" situation will be created be-
cause these individuals can engage in unreasonably risky behavior
without having to worry about personal liability for the harm that
they cause. 317
Although there is merit to Professor Lopucki's argument, I
would emphasize that self-settled spendthrift trusts, foreign or
domestic, are but one way to make oneself judgment proof against
creditors. As Professor Lopucki has pointed out, there are many
devices available to business entities to insulate themselves
against liability. 318 Individuals can also employ a variety of
strategies to limit their liability. 319 Consequently, it seems incon-
sistent to single out self-settled asset trusts for condemnation
while permitting businesses and individuals to avoid liability in so
many other ways.
314. Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14-38 (1996).
315. Id. at 4.
316. Id.
317. Danforth, supra note 51, at 364.
318. Lopucki, supra note 314, at 14-38.
319. Giles, supra note 1, at 623-61.
Duquesne Law Review
C. Arguments for Recognizing Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts
There are a number of reasons why American courts should re-
lax their opposition to self-settled spendthrift protection trusts.
First, the traditional rule against self-settled trusts is not univer-
sally accepted. According to one commentator, "America stands
virtually alone in its rigid and virtually absolute adherence to the
rule against self-settled trusts."32 0 Great Britain has long recog-
nized a form of self-settled spendthrift trust known as a protective
trust. A large number of present and former British possessions
have enacted legislation authorizing self-settled trusts. 21 Even in
the United States, at least eight states have now rejected the ma-
jority view and allow self-settled spendthrift trusts to be created
in their territory. 322 This suggests that there is no consensus
about the legitimacy of self-settled spendthrift trusts and, there-
fore, American courts should respect the choices that other coun-
tries make even though they differ from domestic policy prefer-
ences.
Furthermore, virtually all jurisdictions in the United States al-
low individuals to secure protection from creditors by utilizing
such protective devices as homestead property, tenancies by the
entirety, retirement plans, family limited partnerships, limited
liability companies, life insurance policies, and annuity con-
tracts. 323 To be sure, many of these devices provide only limited
protection against the claims of creditors, 324 but the fact that they
exist with state approval suggests that asset protection strategies
are not necessarily contrary to public policy even though they re-
duce the ability of creditors to obtain payment from their debtors.
Thus, the traditional rule against self-settled trusts is inconsistent
with these state policies that protect debtors.
Another argument is that a broad rule against self-settled
spendthrift trusts gives creditors more rights than settlors when a
trust is self-settled.325 For example, when the self-settled trust is
a support trust or a discretionary trust, the settlor cannot compel
the trustee to distribute funds from the trust. However, under the
traditional rule, a court will compel the trustee to distribute for
320. Sullivan, supra note 19, at 433.
321. See supra, note 27 and accompanying text.
322. Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOzO L. REV. 2685,
2685 (2006).
323. Danforth, supra note 51, at 333-47.
324. Boxx, supra note 3, at 1256.
325. Nenno, supra note 79, at 274.
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the creditor's benefit the maximum amount that the trustee could
have distributed to the settlor. 326 There is no theoretical or prac-
tical justification for this asymmetrical treatment of settlor and
creditor. As Professor Danforth pointed out, the apparent ration-
ale for this approach is the assumption that the settlor will always
control the exercise of trustee discretion when it comes to distribu-
tions from the trust.327 However, there is no proof that this as-
sumption is generally correct, and such conduct, if it did occur,
would be inconsistent with the trustee's fiduciary duty of imparti-
ality. Furthermore, the traditional approach also fails to protect
the interests of other beneficiaries. By allowing a creditor of the
settlor to reach the maximum amount that the trustee could dis-
tribute to him, the traditional rule ignores the fact that other
beneficiaries might be able to challenge such a distribution on
grounds that the trustee violated its duty of impartiality. In other
words, the traditional rule allows creditors to reach trust assets
that might have been distributed to other beneficiaries.
328
Legal scholars also point out that the traditional rule against
self-settled trusts favors inherited wealth over earned wealth.
329
Most states allow a wealthy settlor to create a spendthrift trust for
the benefit of another, typically a child or grandchild, and thereby
preserve the family's wealth from the younger generation's credi-
tors. On the other hand, individuals who acquire wealth by their
own efforts enjoy no such advantage under the traditional rule.
330
Allowing self-settled spendthrift trusts would remove this dispar-
ity and allow persons who acquire wealth to obtain the same pro-
tection as those who inherit it.331
Moreover, there are affirmative reasons to recognize self-settled
spendthrift trusts. First of all, they enable professionals and
small business owners to engage in socially beneficial activities
without fear of being wiped out by massive civil liability. While
large-scale business enterprises can insulate themselves from ex-
cessive liability, 332 individuals like physicians, lawyers, stockbro-
kers, financial planners, architects, farmers, and small business
326. Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 27 A.2d 166, 173 (Conn. 1942); Ware v. Gulda, 117
N.E.2d 136, 137 (Mass. 1954); In re Hortsberg Inter Vivos Trust, 578 N.W.2d 289, 291
(Mich. 1998).
327. Danforth, supra note 51, at 302-03.
328. Id. at 359-60.
329. Note, A Rationale for the Spendthrift Trust, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1332 (1964).
330. Boxx, supra note 3, at 1254-55.
331. Danforth, supra note 51, at 361.
332. Lopucki, supra note 314, at 14-38.
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owners are not so fortunate. According to one commentator, these
people feel that "[e]xpanding theories of legal liability, result-
oriented judges, juries willing to disregard precedent, unpredicta-
bly high damage awards, and the unavailability of adequate in-
surance coverage" have greatly increased their liability expo-
sure. 333 The increasing willingness of juries to make large puni-
tive damage awards has also adversely affected the liability equa-
tion. The prospect of exposure to changing liability rules and ex-
cessive damage awards arguably deters people from engaging in
socially useful, but risky, activities. 334 The protection provided by
self-settled spendthrift trusts may offset some of the undesirable
effects of modern tort law. 335
Self-settled spendthrift trusts also provide some protection
against fraudulent or frivolous lawsuits. 3 6 Unfortunately, our
society has become increasingly litigious. Because few cases go to
trial and settlement is the norm, plaintiffs and their lawyers are
encouraged to bring meritless or even fraudulent lawsuits in the
hopes of receiving a generous settlement from defendants who are
concerned about the costs of litigation or the bad publicity associ-
ated with it. Defendants whose property is protected by a spend-
thrift trust are less inviting targets for such "nuisance" suits.
Some commentators have contended that the immunity from civil
liability offered by self-settled spendthrift trusts may reduce the
incentive to exercise due care or to purchase adequate liability
insurance. 337 They also maintain that if the tort system is out of
control, the proper response is to correct its abuses rather than
provide tortfeasors with immunity from liability. 338 However, the
record shows that thirty years of effort to reform tort law has
yielded little, and there is no reason to think that future efforts
will be any more successful. For individuals whose life savings
are currently threatened by civil liability, self-settled spendthrift
trusts may be a legitimate way to deal with this problem.
In the foregoing discussion, I have attempted to show that the
concept of the self-settled spendthrift trust is not inherently bad.
333. Wagenfeld, supra note 29, at 836-37.
334. Roundtable Discussion, The International Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAVL L. 779,
794 (1999) (noting the comments of Mr. Barry Engel).
335. Brown, supra note 5, at 139.
336. Rothschild, supra note 224, at 65-66.
337. Karen Gebbia-Pinetti, As Certain as Debt and Taxes: Estate Planning, Asset-
Protection Trusts, and Conflicting State Law, in SC60 ADVANCED ESTATE PLANNING
TECHNIQUES 179, 213 (ALL-ABA 1998); Wagenfeld, supra note 29, at 843.
338. Boxx, supra note 3, at 1261.
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Offshore asset protection trusts are nothing more than self-settled
spendthrift trusts (with a few extra protective features) that are
located in a foreign jurisdiction instead of in the United States.
Given the popularity of offshore sites as a place for businesses and
individuals to conduct financial transactions, it would be difficult
to argue that a self-settled spendthrift trust would be undesirable
simply because it is located in a foreign country instead of in the
United States. Consequently, if one can make a case for a domes-
tic self-spendthrift trust, as I have attempted to do above, the
same case can be made on behalf of foreign asset protection trusts.
Of course, both domestic self-settled trusts and foreign asset pro-
tection trusts come in many forms. Therefore, even if we agree to
accept the concept of a self-settled trust, some trusts may raise
policy concerns. For this reason, in the section below I will de-
scribe the type of trust that should be recognized by American
courts.
D. A Proposed Approach to Offshore Asset Protection Trusts
1. Implementation
A basic problem with any rule regarding offshore asset protec-
tion trusts is implementation. Because other countries are in-
volved, the preferred mechanism for implementation would be a
bilateral or multilateral treaty. The United States government
could enter into treaties with the countries that authorize asset
protection trusts. A treaty with Great Britain may be necessary to
cover British possessions like Bermuda or the Cayman Islands,
which are not independent. Such a treaty would provide that
American courts would recognize the validity of offshore trusts
that meet the requirements outlined below in subsection 3. A
more restrictive alternative would apply only to federal bank-
ruptcy courts, thus leaving the states free to extend or withhold
recognition to offshore asset protection as they see fit.
The treaty approach may not be practical. Some overseas juris-
dictions might not be willing to accept the treaty's conditions for
recognition. In addition, the Senate might not be willing to ap-
prove such a treaty. Therefore, it may be necessary to consider
another approach. One alternative, which might be promulgated
by the American Law Institute or the National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and eventually adopted by
state courts or legislatures, would direct the courts to apply the
law of the trust situs, or the law of the jurisdiction specified in the
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trust instrument, if the conditions set forth below in subsection 3
are satisfied.
2. Fraudulent Transfer Laws
Fraudulent transfer laws are necessary to prevent abuse in
connection with the transfer of property to offshore asset protec-
tion trusts. For this reason, American courts must continue to
have the power to set aside all transfers that meet the statutory
definition of "fraudulent." The question is which fraudulent trans-
fer law should control. Possible choices would include the law of
the state where the settlor was domiciled when the transfer was
made, the law of the forum state where the fraudulent transfer
claim is made, or the law of the situs of the trust. This issue
should be determined as part of the rule and not left to the courts
to decide by applying vague choice of law doctrines.
The law where the settlor was domiciled at the time of the
transfer appears to be the most logical choice. This is the law the
settlor would look to at the time of the transfer. One might be
tempted to choose the law of the forum state where a fraudulent
transfer claim is made (assuming that it is different from the
settlor's domicile at the time of the transfer) simply because it
would be the most convenient for the forum court to apply. How-
ever, it seems unfair to evaluate an act by standards that the
settlor could not have known about when the transfer was made.
In addition, such a rule might encourage forum shopping. On the
other hand, there is also something to be said for applying the law
of the situs of the trust. To be sure, fraudulent transfer laws in
many offshore jurisdictions are generally weaker than those in the
United States. Nevertheless, if the law of the trust situs is going
to be applied to substantive provisions of an offshore trust, it
makes sense to apply the law of the trust situs to determine the
validity of the trust as well.
3. A Proposed Rule
State and federal courts, including federal bankruptcy courts,
should apply the law of the trust situs to determine the validity of
a self-settled offshore asset protection trust and the enforceability
of its provisions if the following conditions are met: (1) the trust is
irrevocable for at least ten years, the life of the settlor, or the life
of an income beneficiary, whichever is the shortest; (2) the settlor
has not retained any beneficial interest, other than a reversion, in
the trust; (3) the settlor has not retained a power of appointment
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nor has the right to act as trustee or trust protector; and (4) the
settlor has agreed to retain a copy of trust instrument, and the
trust instrument requires the trustee to render periodic account-
ings to the settlor and all trust beneficiaries.
a. Irrevocability
As the Tax Code recognizes, a settlor who can revoke the trust
at any time has effective control over the trust property. 339 Under
these circumstances, it is unfair to protect the trust property
against the claims of creditors while allowing the settlor access to
it at any time. Consequently, to qualify for protection under my
proposed rule, the trust should be irrevocable for at least ten
years. The only exception would be to allow the trust to terminate
at the death of the settlor or at the death of an income beneficiary.
b. Retention of a Beneficial Interest
It is one thing to allow the settlor to protect a nest egg, but it
seems unfair to allow him to enjoy a present beneficial interest in
the trust which is immune from creditors' claims. Consequently,
the settlor should not be allowed to retain a mandatory income
interest in the trust. On the other hand, a settlor should be able
to retain a reversion in the trust. This would apply to a situation
where the trust terminates after a certain length of time with the
trust corpus reverting back to the settlor.
How should discretionary and support trusts be treated under
this proposed rule? It is not uncommon for the trustee of an off-
shore asset protection trust to be given the power to make discre-
tionary payments of principal or interest to the settlor or others.
If the trust was a domestic self-settled trust, creditors of the
settlor could reach all of the property in the trust that the trustee
could potentially distribute to the settlor. However, under the law
of the trust situs in most offshore locations, creditors would not be
able to reach trust property that was subject to the exercise of dis-
cretion by the trustee because the settlor does not have a benefi-
cial interest in that property. Although discretionary provisions
are certainly capable of being abused, the law of the trust situs
should be respected in this situation.
Support trusts are not commonly established in offshore loca-
tions. Unlike discretionary trusts, the beneficiary of a support
339. I.R.C. § 2038(a) (West 2006); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933).
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trust typically has an interest that is defined by an objective stan-
dard and which can be enforced against the trustee. Logically, if
the settlor has retained a right to receive trust property for sup-
port, that interest should be subject to the claims of domestic
creditors.
c. Exercise of Control over the Trust
The settlor should not be able to exercise formal control over the
trust property, and instead should be forced to rely on the trust
protector and the other beneficiaries to see that the trustee admin-
isters the trust properly. Accordingly, the settlor should not serve
as a trustee or act as a trust protector because this would enable
him to overrule or remove the trustee. However, I believe that the
settlor should be able to serve on an advisory committee to the
trustee. In addition, the settlor should be able to transmit an ad-
visory letter of intent to the trustee when the trust is established.
Finally, although anti-duress clauses and flight clauses serve a
useful purpose by providing peace of mind and protection against
hostile acts by the trustee or third parties, the settlor should not
have the power to invoke these provisions.
d. Disclosure
Blind trusts should not be permitted. The settlor should be re-
quired to retain a copy of the trust. In addition, the trust instru-
ment should require the trustee to provide the settlor and other
beneficiaries with periodic accountings so they will know the value
of the trust and where its assets are invested. This information
need not be made public, but it should be subject to discovery dur-
ing the course of any litigation against the settlor or if the settlor
files for bankruptcy.
e. Special Creditors
Some provision should be made for certain "special creditors"
even if they are not given special treatment in the trust situs ju-
risdiction. As mentioned earlier, courts in many states have in-
voked public policy considerations to allow special creditors to
reach a debtor's interest in domestic spendthrift trusts created by
third persons. It would seem incongruous to treat offshore trusts
any differently. The case for a child support exception is espe-
cially compelling. On the other hand, for the proposal to be con-
sistent, it should respect the policy choices made by the trust situs
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jurisdiction whenever possible. Therefore, the better approach is
to reject any exceptions for spouses, children or other special
creditors unless they are authorized by the situs jurisdiction. In-
stead, American courts can protect spouses and children in divorce
situations by taking offshore trust property into account when
they apportion marital property.
CONCLUSION
Despite the scorn heaped upon them by many American courts,
offshore asset protection trusts serve useful social purposes. The
approach that I have proposed above attempts to balance the in-
terests of settlors, who are often simply trying to protect their
hard-earned savings against dubious or unreasonable tort claims,
and the interests of legitimate creditors. If this proposal, or a
similar one, is adopted, state and federal courts may treat offshore
asset protection trusts with more respect.
